Collection: Directories and Documents > Tanis Thorne Native Californian & Nisenan Collection

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Title: Malfeasance or Indirection [California Indian Superintendency] Collection Type: Directories and Documents Collection Name: Tanis Thorne Native Californian & Nisenan Collection # of Pages: 12 Download PDF: User Login Required Download OCR Text: User Login Required

Date Scanned: 2024-09-03 22:12:09 OCR Software Version #: tesseract 5.4.1 Item Sourced From: PDF First Created: 2025-03-17 03:22:44 Last Updated: 2025-03-17 03:22:44

Original Held At: Searls Historical Library Location: 161 Nevada City Hwy, Nevada City, CA 95959

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< A predominant feature of the superintendency’s fiscal affairs The Historical Society of Southern Cali fornia from the establishment of official relations was the contraction of indebtedness, Throughout the 1851-1867 period, it was a rare superintendent, indeed, who operated entirely on a cash and carry basis. A case in point concerns the treaty commission authorized by Congress in September 1850. Armed witha $25,000 appropriation and instructions to negotiate treaties “as may seem just and proper,” Commissioners Redick McKee, George W. Barbour and Oliver M. Wozencraft concluded, during 1851-1852, eighteen treaties setting aside 7,488,000 acres.’ — Arriving in California, the commissioners found a full scale Indian war seemingly imminent. These officers, believing “The best way to keep these Indians quiet and peaceable is to give them plenty of food,” agreed in many of the treaties to furnish subsistence from the date of signing.” But even before setting sail for California, it was clear to McKee that travel eRpee ai salaries would consume over half the appropriation.® Wozencraft later warned the bureau that the treaties “ . will require mone and it is a subject of surprise and regret that the anemone for our use has been cut down so small.” Considering that their Instructions were of “a general character—no details nothing definite” and that bureau approval would require nearly a year, the commission purchased over $787,000 in supplies on credit. It was a calculated risk; for McKee had been warned that “when the funds.. have been exhausted you will cease negotiations.. as the dept. could not feel justified in authorizing anticipated ex penditures. ..”° Yet, the commissioners felt there was no other alternative and could only hope Congress would accept their argument that “it is, in the end, cheaper to feed the whole flock for a year than to fight them for a week.” Bureau officials had the choice of recommending to Congress payment or repudiation. Neither course was altogether desirable. Payment might encourage government officers to exceed appropriations. Repudiation, on the other hand, could jeopardize government credit. To complicate matters further, creditors, as Superintendent Edward F. Beale later remarked, had “suffered . great loss, & some of them almost ruin” as a result of delayed : payment. A decision was imperative for precisely these reasons." [274] California Indian Business Affairs The intricacy of the accounts complicated by the passage of time blocked a prompt decision. As Beale observed, ‘These accounts go back some years.. . They are so intricate in their character, that it has been found impossible to disentangle them here.” With extra clerical help, Beale proceeded to examine the claims and in 1854 reported “the charges just, and reasonable, and in relation to the amount by which they exceed the appropriation.’’** Beale, however, apparently lacked the ability or capacity to conduct a thorough investigation. As a result, Commissioner George W. Manypenny pressed Congress in 1856 for a complete examination, especially since it appeared the Indians did not receive all the supplies.** Congress in taking up the issue faced a series of involved questions. Should a full scale examination, for example, be conducted or should claims be accepted at their face value? If an investigation was made, would it only result in still more claims? Should all the claims be rejected without an examination on the grounds that the commission had exceeded its authority? Or should those claims, which appeared legitimate, be funded without an investigation? Should the claimants be paid the full amount? Congress was, first of all, less than enthusiastic about an investigation. A $10,000 Senate amendment for that purpose was rejected in 1852 as was a $520,000 appropriation for debt payment. Senator William Gwin’s 1855 measure of $10,000 to check into the claims also failed. Some were apprehensive that an investigation would only encourage more claimants to petition for payment and, thus, escalate the cost even more. Concerning payment, floor debate centered upon the authority to contract the debt. Part and parcel of this issue were suspicions of malfeasance. Congressmen were also concerned about the impact of payment or repudiation, Speaking for the opposition, Congressman Meredith Gentry (Tennessee, Whig) warned “. . if the legislative branch of the Government shall give its sanction to such proceedings, our agents in those remote Territories.. will very speedily bankrupt this Government.” The real issue, in the minds of proponents, was not the matter of authority but who would ultimately pay for the commission’s conduct—the commissioners or the creditors. Creditors, argued one representative, [275]