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Malfeasance or Indirection [California Indian Superintendency] (12 pages)

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Page: of 12

The Historical Society of Southern California
g' ? l
lar e comp ex, difficult and delice alte c g i y Ty ate ff ars th if ou ht to em lo eve
function of a fir st class depar tment.
But Congress failed to implement his recommendation. This
concomitant failure to modify the administrative structure particularly in the post Civil War years, made it difficult for re7
sponsible individuals to respond in times of crisis
Another difficulty was the lack of leadership. Not only were ~
most California superintendents unacquainted with Indan af
fairs, but a party’s defeat at the polls usually meant a change in
superintendents. These facts combined with the dismissal of ae 4
superintendents for suspected fiscal misconduct made for a highl 7
unstable bureaucracy. Given the lack of trained men and aie
tenure, there was in some instances no real superintendent. In the
course of sixteen years (1852-1866), ten men were a minted
superintendent or supervising agent. The 1860-1864, Baal when
the state was divided into a northern and southern disicict was
particularly unstable. During that time, three northern and thre
southern supervising agents were appointed.” Henley’s five a
ap se longest; A. D. Rightmire’s four months the shortest.
crucial impact of this whole system was a lack of continuity.
especially in view of superintendents’ haphazard record kee se
and the practice of removing official papers upon leavin cftice
The na tural consequence was both a misdirection and es eee
0 policy as well as misapplication and misappropriation of public
eee Here was a seemingly impossible situation. Removal of
ureau offices from politics and longer tenure probably would not
have solved the problem. Perhaps it was human nature, observed
Treasury Official Hugh McCulloch, that “Men who iver the reputation of dealing fairly with white men did not hesitate to pracES are most shameful impositions in dealing with Indians.”
— ; — was later accused of ‘shameful dealings” in
The absence of trained conscientious personnel and a poorl
staffed bureau office was aggravated by California’s ventana
Since from four to twelve months was required to exchan :
letters, the bureau had no option but to place greater reliane
than usual on the superintendent. ‘Owing to the remoteness of
California and the length of time necessarily employed in trans[ 288 J
California Indian Business Affairs
mitted communications to and from the same,” wrote Dole in
1861, “the department is compelled in great measure to rely upon
the sagacity and integrity of supervising agents located there.
...'° The impact of this factor cannot be overemphasized. Take,
for example, the case of a drought. In August the superintendent
may have advised Washington that by December the Indians
would either starve or leave the reserves in search of food. Requesting additional money for subsistence and instructions, the
superintendent probably did not receive instructions until well
into the crisis period. Perhaps it was little wonder officers turned
to credit.
Reviewing the course of the California superintendency’s fiscal ~
affairs, indecision, indirection and irregularities were constant
themes. The immediate cause was obvious—bureau administrative structure and remoteness. The solution, in the minds of
informed persons, appeared relatively simple—on the spot supervision by an officer with authority second only to the commissioner. This was clearly Lea’s purpose in 1851 when he suggested
the creation of an assistant commissioner of Indian affairs for
California. But Congress failed to act.”
In 1859 Commissioner J. W. Denver and Secretary of the
Interior Jacob Thompson, suggesting another solution, recommended the abolishment of the superintendency and division of
the state into two administrative districts. Operating both from
a sense of urgency and frustration, they realized the ‘‘colonization” system had failed to “civilize” the Indians and the bureau
had lost fiscal control over its California officers. As Thompson
put it, “With an anxious desire to devise some plan of operations
which promises to secure the welfare of the Indians on the one
hand, and relieve the treasury from the support of a helpless and
dependent population on the other, I recommend as the most
practicable policy the abolition of the superintendency, agencies,
and sub-agencies, and the division of the State into two distinct
Indian districts.” Congress approved the plan but as early as 1862
Secretary of the Interior Caleb B. Smith recommended reestablishment of the California superintendency.”
Another remedy was proposed in 1860 by the California legis\
lature. “Federal Authorities... ,” read the legislature’s petition,
should “cede to the State of California the entire jurisdiction over
[ 289 J